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BOOK REVIEW
ROBERT H. ABRAMSt
Reviewing: PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES: THE TAKING
CLAUSE AS IT RELATES TO LAND USE REGULATION WITHOUT
COMPENSATION. Edited by Bernard H. Siegan. Lexington,
Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1977. Pp. 191. $14.50.
This volume presents a series of papers delivered in 1975 at
a conference entitled "The Taking Issue: An Economic
Analysis."' It is prefaced with an essay by Professor B. H.
Siegan, 2 the chairperson of the conference. The central paper,
by M. Bruce Johnson, decries the present practice of land use
regulation without compensation as "Planning Without
Prices." Several distinguished commentators, both legal and
economic, comment on Johnson's position.4 This review will ex-
amine some of the major topics discussed in the volume and
raise a few objections to its analysis.
Siegan's preface has unusual prominence for an introduc-
tion. 5 In part this stems from the fact that the publication of the
book lagged more than a year and one-half behind the con-
ference and in the interim several judicial opinions had been
rendered which allegedly required exegesis. In part this reflects
the need to establish a working understanding of the concept of
tAssociate Professor of Law, Wayne State University. B.A., 1969; J.D. 1973,
University of Michigan.
1. The legal problem, which is generically described as the taking issue,
arises in determining when in the wake of governmental regulation compensation
must be paid under the due process clause of the fifth amendment (applied to the
states by the fourteenth amendment). The relevant language is: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST., Amend.
V.
2. Siegan, Editor's Introduction: The Anomaly of Regulation under the Tak-
ing Clause, in PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES (B. Seigan, ed. 1977).
3. Johnson, Planning Without Prices: A Discussion of Land Use Regulation
without Compensation, in PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES 63 (B. Siegan, ed. 1977).
4. They are: Anderson, Some Thoughts on the Political Economy of Land
Use Regulation; Hagman, Land Use Regulation without Compensation: A Mugwum-
pian View; Davis, A Political Economist Views the Taking Issue; Tarlock, A Cor-
relative Rights Approach to the Taking Issue; Johnson, Response to the Discussants of
"Planning Without Prices," in PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES (B. Siegan, ed. 1977).
5. The essay occupies 62 of 184 pages in the volume, thus exceeding in




private property6 at the outset of any discourse on the taking
issue. Siegan's preface, however, becomes an assault on the
spate of modem precedents7, which have broadened the ambit
of permissible governmental activity in the area of land use
planning. In the face of calls for even broader governmental
freedom from the compensation requirement of the Bill of
Rights,8 Siegan offers a redefinition of the problem.
Siegan attempts to draw from the condemnation and inverse
condemnation cases, which were decided under the Holmesian
formulation from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,9 a defini-
tion of private property that includes as a compensible property
interest the invasion of landowner expectations of future profits
or profitable uses.10 The relevant inquiry becomes: When may a
property owner successfully pursue an action for inverse con-
demnation. Taken together, the inverse condemnation decisions
present a series of ad hoc determinations that in the particular
circumstances the government must compensate. It is not ob-
vious that an award of damages to a particular plaintiff is in-
dicative of the appropriate outer limits of governmental
authority, let alone a basis for wholesale invalidation of the
regulatory powers of government." While Siegan does not ex-
plicitly make such a claim, he appears to have such a goal in
mind, for if his definition of private property is correct, then all
that is left is a mechanical denouement reciting that all govern-
6. Taking issues occur in many contexts where the asserted effect of govern-
mental activity is the curtailment or destruction of private property. See, e.g., Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (legislation requiring destruction of private property
to prevent spread of blight); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)
(legislation prohibiting full exercise of privately owned mineral rights to avoid sub-
sidence of residentially occupied lands); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
(restriction on type of use to be made of a parcel, which forced elimination of a highly
profitable existing use, leaving no commensurate use available).
7. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118
Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
8. See THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZEN'S POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH
(W. Reilly ed. 1973); F. BOSSELMAN. D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE
(1973); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
9. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Justice Holmes' famous formulation is that a regula-
tion which is too restrictive becomes a taking. Id. 413.
10. Siegan's discussion of Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v.
United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973), and Keystone Assocs. v. State, 82 Misc. 2d 620,
371 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Ct. Cl. 1975), affd, 33 N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254, 352
N.Y.S.2d 194 (1972) is particularly in point. Siegan, supra note 2, at 7-8, 15-16.
11. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 459-65 (1978).
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mental land use controls interfere with such property interests,
and are therefore appropriately viewed as takings. 12
The Johnson paper starts with a similar premise, that "[i]t is
important to agree at the outset that the debate is over property
rights . -.13 Unlike Siegan, Johnson initially leaves the term
"private property" undefined so that the issue becomes what
property interests will be protected by the taking clause.
Johnson demonstrates the profundity of the consequences which
will follow from the definition ultimately chosen. Johnson's
argument is essentially simple although its legal underpinnings
are difficult to follow: absent some price mechanism, govern-
ment regulators of property use will overregulate, causing a
severely sub-optimal utilization of land as a resource. Johnson's
solution is an indirect one, calling for further research into the
role of property rights in civil and economic liberty. 14 Implicit
in his plea' 5 is the threat that too narrow a definition of com-
pensible property interests will vitiate important constitutional
guarantees of individual freedom.' 6
The legal reasoning which prefaces the bold leap to such a
conclusion is deserying of explication. Initially Johnson notes
that the Constitution's language sets up two entirely separate
protections-one requiring due process for all deprivations of
life, liberty, and property; another requiring (without apparent
qualification) compensation when private property is taken for
public use. 1 He then notes that the broad due process protec-
tion is a qualified protection; the police power of the state can
permissibly operate to the detriment of individual claims of pro-
tected interests. Moreover, the concept of permissible regulation
has grown from nuisance abatement, a long acknowledged
governmental prerogative, to nuisance prevention with the 1926
decision of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 18 Shortly thereafter, the
12. Indeed, Siegan attempts such a demonstration, with emphasis on refuting
the propriety of the special deference given to zoning regulation. See Siegan, supra
note 2, at 16-50.
13. Johnson, supra note 3, at 65.
14. Id. 104.
15. Johnson's discussion makes this point explicit. Id. 79-81.
16. Perhaps overstating his own position, Johnson, in conclusion, raises the
spectre that other guaranteed freedoms will also perish in the wake of unchecked
government regulation: "Until this task is accomplished, fundamental individual
rights will continue to erode in the face of pressures to advance the cause c6lbre of
the day." Id. 104.
17. Id. 68.
18. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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doctrine of substantive due process fell into disrepute,
eliminating another check on the potential majoritarian tyranny
of the legislature and the agencies it creates. Reflecting on this
state of affairs, Johnson, after establishing an unusual model of
constitutional values, 19 concludes that the "submissive" due pro-
cess protection of the fifth amendment offers no protection to
property. Thus, the taking clause remains the only hope: "[I]f
the state does not pay compensation for damage it does by its
regulation, then private property rights have vanished."20 One
need not parse Johnson's words to realize that his empty vessel
attitude toward property rights is already filled with intuitive
notions of substantive content. The "damage" that will flow
from government regulation not accompanied by compensation
must be damage stemming from the destruction of some aspect
of private property. In short, Johnson's paper is not neutral
because he implicitly defines the content of private property
rights without justifying his choice.
In contrast to Johnson's implicit definition of protected pro-
perty rights is the definition offered by Professor A. Dan
Tarlock. Tarlock states that: "The current tension between
private property and government regulation arises out of need
to assign property rights in common property resources that
have not been previously seen as common." 2' Noting, as does
Johnson, that natural law and natural rights theories of proper-
ty have been eclipsed in the twentieth century, Tarlock proceeds
in an entirely different direction. He does not seek to reinvest
the private property tradition with new vitality, rather he builds
on a model which acknowledges the authority of society to
subordinate individual interests to societal interests. Specifical-
ly, Tarlock nurtures the concept that the goal of modern pro-
perty law is "to assign [property] rights so that the maximum
number of users can make an efficient use of the property." 22
19. This description of Johnson's constitutional model may, in fact, be too
polite, for the model proposed appears to be nonsense. Johnson envisions a con-
tinuum which runs between "absolute police power at one end and the due process
protection at the other." Johnson, supra note 3, at 80. Realistically, however, Johnson
is seeking to assert (albeit inartfully) that the scope and standard of judicial review of
legislative reduction of individual freedom varies depending on the right allegedly
abridged. He argues property should regain its former place, close to speech, in the
hierarchy of constitutionally valued and judicially protected freedoms.
20. Johnson, supra note 3, at 81.




Thus, society as a regulator can validly regulate, without paying
compensation, when the object of the regulation is an assertion
of the correlative rights in the property, which are "owned" by
other property holders or society at large. In contrast, regula-
tions which expropriate a benefit and confer it on a broader,
more diffuse class are compensable. While this is an interesting
thesis, it is not developed with enough detail to allow truly
meaningful discussion. 23
The use of economic analysis in Planning Without Prices oc-
casions somewhat less comment than did the definition of
private property. The presentation is largely direct and
understandable; the principles applied are familiar even to
those who have only a passing knowledge of price theory and
microeconomics. There are, however, some interesting wrinkles
to Johnson's presentation. For example, Johnson maintains that
the displeasure of those who object to a private market decision
to develop previously untrammeled natural resources should be
ignored. This is a specific illustration of the general problem of
treating adverse psychological effects as externalities. 24
Although Johnson recognizes that it is theoretically possible to
create an economic system that considers the welfare of these
remote third parties, 25 he concludes that "this organization of
society could theoretically block all economic activity ....
Recognizing that a typical market economy will not reflect the
psychological costs to those opposing a particular resource deci-
sion, he notes that the alternative method of accounting for
such costs is state regulation.2 7
23. See Johnson's intriguing rebuttal on the ground that there is much am-
biguity inherent in Tarlock's model regarding the original assignment of correlative
property interests. Johnson, supra note 4, at 182-83.
24. For a thorough definition of externality, see Johnson, supra note 3, at 74.
Johnson quotes Pigou:
[O1ne person A, in the course of rendering some service... to a second per-
son B, incidentally also renders services or disservices to other persons (not
producers of like services), of such a sort that payment cannot be exacted
from the benefited parties or compensation enforced on behalf of the in-
jured parties.
Id., quoting A.C. PIGOu, THE EcONOMICS OF WELFARE 183 (1932).
25. This describes a Pareto-optimal system. Stated simply, a transaction is
Pareto-preferred when there is no one in the society who would feel themself worse off
if the transaction were made. A particular set of transactions is Pareto-optimal if all
possible Pareto-preferred transactions have occured. See generally Johnson, supra
note 3, at 72-73 and authorities cited therein.
26. Id. 76.
27. He states, "the market itself will internalize in a private property system
some (many or few?) of the externalities without state interference." Johnson, supra
note 3, at 83.
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In a series of oblique passages, Johnson then discusses the
limitations on state power to regulate in order to avoid the im-
position of psychological costs on those opposing a particular
resource decision, such as the development of previously
undeveloped resources. In this analysis, Johnson explores side
constraints, which he largely defines by example. In his view,
for instance, the first amendment free speech guarantee can be
considered a side constraint that would insulate the sale of
books advocating unpopular ideas from state regulation. While
there will still be some individuals who may feel less well off
because the unpopular views are being disseminated, the side
constraint prevents government from acting to protect their
feelings. Restated in economic terms, the net effect of side con-
straints is to allow analysis of a particular transaction to ignore
externalities if the cause of those externalities is within the am-
bit of the side constraint.
Having developed this elaborate analytic superstructure,
Johnson is then able to unleash side constraints as a basis for ig-
noring the welfare losses of conservationists. Government in-
tervention to prevent these losses would appear impossible in a
Pareto-preferred 28 system because of the presumed diversity of
individual tastes. Some individuals will feel themselves less well
off as a consequence of the regulation unless compensation is
paid.29 Of course, the payment of compensation would in turn
engender disappointment in those who oppose its payment. 30
To Johnson, the means of avoiding this unhappy state action is
to increase the constraint set of individual rights, particularly
the rights of private property. Thus, it seems Johnson has taken
an interesting but circuitous path only to assume his
conclusion.1
While it would be possible to comment further on other im-
portant themes32 found in Planning Without Prices, this review
28. For a definition of Pareto-preferred see note 26 supra.
29. Johnson, supra note 3, at 83.
30. It is apparent that such individuals exist, see, e.g., Plater, The Takings
Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEx. L. REV. 201
(1974).
31. In fact, Johnson himself seems to say as much. He states:
"The larger the constraint set of individual rights, the smaller the set of admissi-
ble externalities subject to state action. This approach, which may strike some as a
finesse of the problem, reduces the area of controversial activities by definition."
Johnson, supra note 3, at 83.
32. Johnson's analysis of why bureaucracies produce over regulation and the
Johnson-Hagman debate over the impact of land use controls on the poor, are but
two of many topics which merit attention.
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has sufficiently conveyed the flavor of the volume and the issues
therein. Although the book is heavily weighted toward Siegan's
position,"3 which favors market economics as the preferred
allocative device, it makes a useful contribution to the literature
on the role of the fifth amendment in the land use planning
context. Despite its organizational faults and gaps in logic the
papers are well researched and provocative, making it a
valuable source of information on the taking issue. The volume
is weakened by the relative brevity of the papers and the inade-
quacy of conference paper format for so vast a subject. There is
still much to be said of the taking issue in the planning.
context. 4
33. See, e.g., B.H. SIEGAN, OTHER PEOPLE'S PROPERTY (1976); B.H. SIEGAN,
LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1973).
34. For a recent attempt at clarification in this difficult field see, B.A. ACKER-
MAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977). But see Epstien, Book
Review, 30 STAN. L. REV. 635 (1978).
